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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTSARCHAIC PRINCIPLES PRECLUDE NECESSARY REFORM
I. Introduction
The Court of Chancery served a very useful function in early English society'
by providing aggrieved parties with a remedy unavailable to them under the
common law.2 Since the law courts had become so insistent upon the requirement that a party file a writ specifically designed to encompass a particular cause
of action, often the questions permeating an action were so peculiar that the
rigid writs were inappropriate to provide the court with jurisdiction.' Parties
unable to secure relief under the law sought other machinery more amenable to
their needs. The Chancery Court, characterized by its individualized approach,
fashioned a writ appropriate to the particular circumstances and provided the
aggrieved party with an equitable remedy.4
The formulation and adherence to definite principles by the English courts
produced many deficiencies in the common law.' Although the courts administered "law," they failed to provide "justice" as it was envisioned by society. The
community morals dictated that disputes be settled justly and fairly, but the
courts viewed their role as one of providing certainty and stability to the relations
between men, with little or no regard for justice.8 The common law was simply
unable to stay abreast of the changing philosophy and composition of English
society." Equity was "founded on a sense of justice," however, and very adept
at confronting the exigencies of the diverse society.' Many commentators9 have
suggested that the maintenance of equity has injected a sense of fairness into the
common law, while at the same time retaining the hallmark of fashioning new
remedies for the ills of society:
[Elquity is, or should be, a living, changing thing, forever adapting itself to
new conditions; in its ultimate sense it is a supreme law, acting upon and
modifying codes, statutes, and case law. The avoidance of the freezing of
law into inflexible rules is one of its chief purposes.10
Although the administration of equity nurtured the common law development in England and America, its continued viability in a complex, industrialized
nation in the twentieth century is subject to serious question. The distinct equit1
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able decrees, such as specific performance, certainly are necessary in a modern
society, but their value as remedies has been impeded by the courts' application
of the principles. The deficiencies of the common law-certainty and precedenthave completely invaded the once fair and just equity courts. A petitioner is
now entitled to equitable relief only if his complaint can be fashioned in terms
within the purview of an established principle.
The judiciary's reluctance to grant equitable decrees is clearly evidenced
in the construction industry. 1 When building contractors fail to commence or
complete construction, the owner is refused specific performance of the contract
unless the circumstances surrounding the breach are within the precise limits
delineated by precedent.' Often, the contract is rendered a nullity and deprived
of its sanctity by the inability (i.e., the unwillingness) of the court to deviate
from precedent.
A search necessitated by the desire of businessmen to discover an institution responsive to their needs has apparently culminated in the discovery of arbitration. In addition to the arbitrator's power to grant specific performance,
arbitration is much more advantageous to the parties than litigation.'" Notwithstanding these facts, however, it is imperative that the judiciary modernize its
approach to construction contract breaches to insure that justice is not made
entirely dependent upon whether the dispute is settled through arbitration or
litigation.
II. Specific Performance
A. The HistoricalFramework
As a general nile, state and federal courts refuse to grant specific performance of construction contracts if damages would adequately compensate the injured party, 4 the petitioner owns or is in control of the realty upon which the
construction is to ensue,' the decree would require extensive court supervision
of the construction project,' 6 or the terms of the contract are so indefinite that
to grant the relief the court would be forced to substitute its judgment for that
of the parties." Courts do not, however, generally refuse such a decree if the
11 See, e.g., Nelson v. Darling Shop of Birmingham, Inc., 275 Ala. 598, 157 So. 2d 23
(1963); Walberg v. Moudy, 164 Cal. App. 2d. 786, 331 P.2d 234 (1958); Northern Delaware
Indus. Dev. Corp. v. E. W. Bliss Co., 245 A.2d 431 (Del. 1968); Levene v. Enchanted Lake
Homes, Inc., 115 So. 2d 89 (Fla. App. 1959); Ayers v. Baker, 216 Ga. 132, 114 S.E.2d 847
(1960); Bessinger v. National Tea Co., 75 Ill. App. 2d 395, 221 N.E.2d 156 (1966).
12 See, e.g., Wood v. Estes, 224 Ala. 140, 139 So. 331 (1932); London Bucket Co. v.
Stewart, 314 Ky. 832, 237 S.W.2d 509 (1951); Di Cataldo v. Harold Corp., 15 N.J. Super.
471, 83 A.2d 545 (1951); Savitt v. Ronclare Homes, 110 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
13 See text accompanying notes 84-88, infra.
14 See, e.g., Lester's Home Furnishers Co. v. Modern Furniture Co., 1 N.J. Super. 365,
61 A.2d 743 (1948).
15 See, e.g., Levene v. Enchanted Lake Homes, Inc. 115 So. 2d 89 (Fla. App. 1959); Ayers
v. Baker, 216 Ga. 132, 114 S.E.2d 847 (1960); McCormick v. Proprietors of Mt. Auborn,
285 Mass. 548, 189 N.E. 585 (1934).
16 See, e.g., Nelson v. Darling Shop of Birmingham, Inc., 275 Ala. 598, 157 So. 2d 23
(1963); Queens Plaza Amusement v. Queens Bridge Realty Corp., 22 Misc. 2d 315, 36
N.Y.S.2d 326 (1942).
17 See, e.g., Bessinger v. National Tea Co., 75 Ill. App. 2d 395, 221 N.E.2d 156 (1966);
Berne v. Payson, 155 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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construction involves only a single act or operation," the petitioner has contracted with a builder to purchase land and a building to be constructed in the
future, 9 or the defendant has benefited by the contract and damages would inadequately compensate the injured plaintiff.2"
In actuality, however, court reluctance to grant specific performance is not
founded upon the actual inability to supervise the project; nor is it based upon
the fact that an injured party will be adequately compensated by damages. In
some decisions the construction calls for only minimal supervision,2 while in
others a damages award can never completely restore the injured party to the
status quo." Realistically, court reluctance to grant specific relief is derived
from precedent and reasoning established during the very early years of the
Court of Chancery.22 Any equitable decree which could have ultimately proved
unenforceable could have easily jeopardized the standing and integrity of the
Chancery. Thus, the Chancellor granted decrees only when the contract dictated
that a single act be performed.24 Although the English courts have since abandoned such reasoning,25 it remains a major factor in American decisions. There
is no valid justification for continuing to adhere to such reasoning in all situations, except that, as one notable jurist has stated, "... the old notion, intrenched
in textbooks and encyclopedias, dies hard."2
B. Courts and the GeneralPrinciples
Although the general equity principles have become firmly established in
many states,2 not all courts have applied them with any great degree of consistency. In 1895, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Jones v. Parker,28
granted specific performance of a contract to install a heating. plant and light
fixtures in the basement of a building constructed by the defendant. Although
the structure was under lease to the plaintiff, he could have easily secured the
services of another firm and then recovered the installation costs in a suit at
law. The court, however, was unconcerned with the adequacy of damages.
Since the contract terms were sufficiently definite and there were very few problems relating to the supervision of the project, specific performance was warranted.25 The court concluded that it was not a "... universal rule that courts
of equity never will enforce a contract which requires some building to be done.
18 See, e.g., Bakersfield Country Club v. Pacific Water Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 528, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 573 (1961).
19 See, e.g., Ammerman v. City Stores Co., 394 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Laurel
Realty Co. v. Himelfarb, 191 Md. 462, 62 A.2d 263 (1948); contra, Di Cataldo v. Harold
Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 471, 83 A.2d 545 (1951).
20 Spoolan Realty Corp. v. Haebler, 147 Misc. 9, 262 N.Y.S. 197 (1931).
21 See, e.g., Bessinger v. National Tea Co., 75 Ill. App. 2d 395, 221 N.E.2d 156 (1966);
McCormick v. Proprietors of Mt. Auborn, 285 Mass. 548, 189 N.E. 585 (1934).
22 See, e.g., Di Cataldo v. Harold Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 471, 83 A.2d 545 (1951).
23 Oleck, Specific Performance of Builders Contracts, 21 FoRD. L. REv. 156 (1952); Oleck,
Specific Performance of Contracts Through Arbitration, 6 ARB. J. (n.s.) 163, 163-64 (1951).
24 Pound, The Progress of the Law-Equity, 33 HARv. L. Rlv. 420, 434 (1920).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See text accompanying notes 14-20, supra.
28 163 Mass. 564, 40 N.E. 1044 (1895).
29 Id. at 566-67, 40 N.E. at 1045.
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They have enforced such contracts from the earliest days to the present time.""0
Although Jones was clearly contrary to the principle which precludes spedfic performance of contracts if an adequate remedy at law exists, the court was
intent upon rendering justice rather than adhering to precedent. In Bakersfield
Country Club v. Pacific Water Co.,31 the court followed a very similar approach
when it ordered the defendant to specifically perform his agreement to install
water pipe lines on the plaintiff's property. The court alluded to the rule which
precludes specific performance of contracts requiring continuous supervision
over the project,"2 but determined that the installation of water service lines
to the plaintiff's subdivision entailed "only a single operation.""3 Clearly the
validity of such a declaration is subject to serious question; however, the holding
is meritorious since the court refused to recognize the serious complications which
could have ensued from such an undertaking. The court implicitly conveyed its
recognition and understanding of the inherent limitations of the precedent under
consideration.
In City Stores Co. v. Ammerman, 4 District Judge Gasch delivered an eloquent opinion in which he ordered the defendant to execute a lease and construct a building for the petitioner. The court determined that the defendant
had granted the plaintiff a unilateral option contract 5 which entitled the plaintiff to lease space in a proposed shopping center as one of the major tenants
on ". . . terms at least equal to that of any other major department store in the
center.""8 The contract was definite enough to warrant performance notwithstanding the fact that the design of the building, the construction details, and
the cost of the construction had not yet been agreed upon." Also, the court
explicitly rejected the defendant's contentions that he would suffer financially
if forced to build and lease to the petitioner"3 and that the plaintiff's remedy
was an action at law for damages.39 It is apparent, however, that damages
would not have adequately compensated the plaintiff since it is unlikely that he
could have secured a lease with any other center without foregoing substantial
profits during the interim.
It is interesting to note that the precise question presented to the Ammerman
court for determination had never been decided before in the District of Columbia." This may partially explain the court's apparent disinterestedness in established principles of equity. Judge Gasch so astutely stated:
...as a matter of law that the mere fact that a contract, definite in material
respects, contains some terms which are subject to further negotiation be30 Id. at 567, 40 N.E. at 1045.
31 192 Cal. App. 2d 528, 13 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1961).
32 Id. at 539, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
33 Id. at 539, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
34 266 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1967).
35 Id. at 771.
36 The clause is recited in the unilateral contract which was reprinted in the court's
opinion. Id. at 770.
37 Id. at 775.
38 Id. at 779.
39 Id. at 776.

40 Id.
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tween plaintiff and defendant will not bar a decree for specific performance,
if in the court's discretion specific performance should be granted.'
His reasoning is indicative of the court's acknowledgement that the degree of
supervision inherent in a decree of specific performance is not completely determinative of the result. This court developed a simple test in which the plaintiff's interest in compliance with the contract is of the utmost concern: "... . contracts for construction of buildings and other contracts requiring extensive
supervision of the court... should be specifically enforced unless the difficulties
of supervision outweigh the importance of specific performance to the plain42
tiff."
The overwhelming impact of Ammerman, however, was limited by -two
factors. The defendant was in control of the proposed site of the shopping center
and the contract called for the execution of a lease in addition to the construction of a building. Both factors reinforced the district court's decision, but did
not provide the foundation for it. The circuit court, however, restricted the district court's holding by basing its confirmation upon those two grounds.'
Not all courts, however, have approached the issue of specific performance
with indifference toward the traditional indicia necessary to the promulgation
of such decrees. Often, courts instinctively deny specific performance without
seriously considering the merits of the dispute on an ad hoc basis. As one commentator has so characteristically stated: "But what happens when a judge
sits in equity? Today there is a vast body of case law to bind him, just as though
he were sitting in a court of law, and he is bound by precedent.""" Too often
reliance upon precedent obscures the court's view of its functions as a tribunal.
The Delaware Supreme Court was preoccupied with precedent to such an
extent in Northern Delaware Indus. Dev. Corp. v.E. W. Bliss Co., 4 5 that it
totally misconstrued the questions raised by the litigation. Since the contractor
had failed to comply with the completion schedules of the construction contract
under which he had agreed to supply all labor, materials, and equipment necessary to expand the premises of a steel mill, the plaintiff sought a court order
After noting
directing the contractor to requisition 300 additional workers.'
the problems inherent in supervising and enforcing such an order, 7 the court
concluded that it ".... should not.., become committed to supervising the carrying out of a massive, complex, and unfinished construction contract... ."" An
appropriate remedy, however, would not have required continued supervision
because the court had been requested only to order the requisition of additional
41
42

Id. at 775 (emphasis added).
Id. at 776 (emphasis added).

43 Ammerman v. City Stores Company, 394 F.2d 950, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The
circuit court stated: "Thus, where the contractual obligation being enforced involves more
than the mere construction of a building when the building is to be built on land controlled
by its owner ... specific performance becomes entirely appropriate." Id.
44 Gleen & Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REv. 753, 758

(1945).
45
46

245 A.2d 431 (Del. 1968).
The defendant was not required to employ any specific number of laborers under the

terms of the contract. Id. at 432.
47 Id. at 433.
48 Id. at 432.
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workers and not to supervise a construction project. Also, if the defendant had
refused to comply with the order, civil sanctions could have been imposed. The
court's- implicit acknowledgement of the fact that the order would have been
granted if the project had been expressly designed, nearly completed, and the
construction agreement had been incorporated into a contract for the sale of
land only served to pronounce its misunderstanding of the issues.4 These factors could have affected the degree of supervision necessary, if such a question
had been in issue; but, it is evident that they could have had only minimal impact upon the ability of the court to enforce its decree.
In Di Cataldo v. Harold Corp.," the defendant had openly repudiated his
agreement to construct a house on land which was to have been conveyed to
the plaintiff. In addition to the court's refusal to adhere to the established rule
sanctioning specific performance if the defendant is in possession of the realty,"1
it blatantly disregarded the terms of the contract. The court's declaration that
the contract was too indefinite to warrant specific relief was seemingly unjustified
in view of the fact that the contract had included the financial terms of the agreement, the dimensions of the realty and structure, who was to pay the taxes, insurance, and title fees, and that the purchaser was to be permitted to select the
colors of paint, wall paper, and carpet.52 Although the contract failed to indicate
whether the house was to have been of brick or wood construction, the court
could have easily taken a sample of other homes in the subdivision where the
plaintiff's house was to be constructed to have determined the type of building
originally agreed upon. Then the construction could have been ordered to
proceed in conformity with other houses built by the defendant. The Ammerman court employed such a technique when it ordered the defendant to construct
the plaintiff's structure in conformity with the standards delineated in the agreements of other major tenants." Also, an agreement to construct a home "according to 'submitted plans and specifications' " had not prevented the Kentucky
Court of Appeals from ordering the defendant to resume construction in Billy
Williams Builders & Developers Inc. u. Hillerich."4
The judiciary's lack of concern for administering justice and its steadfast
49 Id. at 433.
50 15 N.J. Super. 471, 83 A.2d 545 (1951).
51 See, e.g., Ammerman v. City Stores Co., 394 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Billy Williams Builders & Dev. Inc. v. Hillerich, 446 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1969); 4 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 1402 (5th ed. 1941).
52 The construction agreement was recited in Di Cataldo v. Harold Corp., 15 N.J.
Super. 471, 474, 83 A.2d 545, 546 (1951). The following clauses are pertinent to the subject matter of the text:
[Said premises to consist of a one-family dwelling, slab construction, radiant heat,
33' x 26' on a lot 55' x 100' ± or - in accordance with plans and specifications of
the seller to be filed with and approval of F.H.A. and/or V.A. and the Town of
West Orange, for the price of $9,900.00 payable as follows ....
The purchaser may exercise the privilege of selecting his or her choice of colors
as offered by the seller in bathroom fixtures, wall and floor tile in bathroom, wall to
wall carpet in living-dining room and choice of 750 grade wallpapers or one color
of pastel wall paint.
Advance taxes, insurance, interest on mortgage if any, title fees, F.H.A. fees and
closing costs of approximately $335.00 will be paid by the purchaser ....
This contract is the full and complete agreement between the purchaser and
seller ....
Id.
53 City Stores Co. v. Ammerman, 266 F. Supp. 766, 778 (D.D.C. 1967).
54 446 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Ky. 1969).
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adherence to precedent was also exhibited in Bessinger-v. National Tea Co. "
when an Illinois court refused to grant specific performance of a lease providing
for the construction of a 93,000 sq. ft. building which was to ". .-.be of as
good or better quality and workmanship as the commercial building recently
constructed for... lessee as a food supermarket in Rolling Meadows, Illinois.""8
Although the determination that this clause was too uncertain to warrant specific
performance' could have been justified under certain circumstances, it was entirely inappropriate in Bessinger. Not only was the supermarket to have been
fashioned after the defendant's chain stores, but also the defendant's interest in
owning a structurally and architecturally well-designed building was sufficient to
guide his manner of construction. Also, the plaintiff pleaded that he would
agree to any plans submitted to him by the contractor provided they complied
with the square footage recited in the lease. The court, however, rejected these
factors and adhered to its theory that by refusing an equitable remedy the need
for extended supervision would be eliminated, disagreement between the parties
would be avoided, and it would not be forced to supply necessary contract
58
terms.
The E. W. Bliss, DiCataldo, and Bessinger courts failed to acknowledge
the theory underlying the creation of equity. Essentially, their approach placed
the judiciary's interest in maintaining an orderly and tranquil judicial system
before the plaintiff's interest in receiving that property for which he bargained.
If equity is to resume its position as "... a force which gives shape to the ideal
of decent and honorable conduct in the relations of man with man," 9 courts
must examine all the circumstances in each case and render decisions founded
upon principles conducive to the promotion of the business world and not to the
judicial system. While the passage of time has prompted the transformation of
an agrarian society into that of a world industrial center, courts have continued
to administer principles developed in the nineteenth century.
To achieve an adeptness in remedying the ills of a highly complex, industrialized society, courts would not have to grant specific performance in all contract disputes. Often, the denial of such a decree is warranted. If the plaintiff
may easily complete construction by doing the work himself or by purchasing
the services of another, he would suffer very little by resorting to a suit at law
for damages. In Ayers v. Baker," a Georgia court forced such a remedy upon
the plaintiff by denying his request for specific performance of a contract to build
a swimming pool."' Similarly, the Wood v. Estes62 court declared that damages
would adequately compensate the plaintiff for the defendant's breach of a con3
tract to construct a street and sidewalk on the plaintiffs land.
Since specific performance is founded upon .the "equitable concept of relief
55

75 Ill.
App. 2d 395, 221 N.E.2d 156 (1966).

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 397, 221 N.E.2d at 157.
Id. at 400, 221 N.E.2d at 158.
Id. at 401, 221 N.E.2d at 159.
Newman, supra note 6, at 681.
216 Ga. 132, 114 S.E.2d 847 (1960).
Id. at 135, 114 S.E.2d at 850.
224 Ala. 140, 139 So. 331 (1932).
Id. at 144, 139 So. at 333-34.
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from hardship,""4 contracts similar to those found in Ayers and Wood do not
merit equitable relief because the plaintiff has not suffered any real or apparent
harm. He may have been inconvenienced by the need to secure the services of
another to complete the construction and by the delay in completion of his project, but he has not incurred any judicially recognizable hardship. In such cases,
the plaintiff will absorb the brunt of the inconveniences; but, in decisions akin
to E. W. Bliss and Bessinger, it is society as a whole which must bear the burden
of the hardship. In Di Cataldo, society was not burdened, but the decision did
impose a hardship on the plaintiff which amounted to more than a mere inconvenience. The court's substitution of money damages for the particular realty
inadequately compensated him for his loss.
The burden imposed upon society via the judiciary's reluctance to grant
specific performance in cases which merit such a decree generally manifests itself
in terms of economic consequences. The E. W. Bliss court's refusal to order the
requisition of additional workers not only affected the local economy, but also,
conceivably, the national economy. The steel laborers that were hired, or those
likely to have been hired, to work in the new mills were forced to delay their
starting dates, thereby causing them to forego earned income. If the mill had
expended money on salaries, income capable of multiplying itself 5 would have
been injected into the economy. Either local or imported goods and services
would have been purchased with part of the income which would have been
earned by the employees. The money which would have been expended on local
goods and services would have created increased employment and generated an
increased spending by other people in the local economy; however, any money
which would have been expended on imports would have produced a "drain"
on local income, but occasioned an injectment of "new" money into the community which produced the goods.6 Thus, either the national or local economy,
64 Newman, supra note 8, at 417.
65 The income "multiplier" is comprised of the variables of personal savings, imported
and exported goods, and tax disbursements. Any money which is saved, paid for taxes, or
expended on imported goods causes an income "leakage" to the local community. The greater
the amount of money which flows out of a community, the less there is available for the
purchase of goods and services. If, however, goods produced by local manufacturers are exported to other communities, "foreign money" will flow into the local economy and increase
spending on goods and services.
The rate of employment in a community is directly related to the local supply of money.
If the amount of money flowing into a local economy increases, the employment rate will
correspondingly increase; whereas, if the money flowing out of an economy increases, as a result
of an increased spending on imported goods, the employment rate will decrease. See W.
TnoMpsoN, A PREFACE To URBAN ECONOMICS 142-47 (1968).
Although the income "multiplier" concept is not easily explained or defined, it is rather
easily depicted by a very simple, extreme illustration. If an entire community, on a single day,
either withdrew all money from circulation and saved it at a zero interest rate or paid all
available money to the federal government for income taxes, the community would, in effect,
"die" since there would no longer be any money available to pay salaries or purchase products
and services. If the entire community, however, purchased goods produced in another community (imports), the effect upon the money supply would not be as noticeable because the
local merchants who supplied the imports would retain their profits from the sales. Since the
merchant would have to pay the producer for the cost of the goods, the greater portion of
the purchase price would flow out of the local economy. If, however, a community produced all
goods necessary for local consumption (thus, no imports needed) and exported some goods, the
community would probably attain a 100% employment rate. Money would continue to flow
into the community (which would be derived from the exported goods), but very little would
flow out of the economy (tax disbursements would be one "drain" on the economy).
66

W. TEOMpSON, A PREFACE To URBAN ECONOMICS 142-47 (1968).

[Vol 47:1025]

NOTES

or both, would have benefited from the earlier employment of the steel workers.
Also, "foreign money" flowing into the local economy would have heightened if
the prospective employees would 7have increased the steel production for exportation to other areas of the nation.6
The local income "multiplier" would also have been affected in Bessinger
if, and only if, the defendant had not granted another local entrepreneur a lease
and construction agreement after he had repudiated his contract with the plaintiff. If another local merchant had executed an agreement with the defendant,
the income that would have been generated by the plaintiff's business would not
have been lost to the local economy, but only replaced by the income from the
other owner's business. If, however, a second agreement had not been executed,
the income which would have originated from the plaintiff's business-would have
been a total loss to the economy.
Another rationale for reversing the judicial system's present approach to
specific performance is founded in its reluctance to supervise extensive construction projects. Although the courts' position merits attention, it is not unrealistic
to contend that compliance with a decree could be forthcoming with little or no
court supervision. Many large and diversified construction contractors stand to
lose future bids if their substandard business practices are made public. A delay
in performance by a contractor, unworkmanlike construction, or a repudiation
of a court decree could easily jeopardize a company's future business.
III. The English Approach
Great Britain's judiciary has taken a slightly more realistic approach in
determining the efficacy of a decree for specific performance than have their
American counterparts. The particular circumstances surrounding each cause
of action are considered in relation to the degree of the parties' interests in securing equitable relief, 8 notwithstanding the binding effect of precedent. 9 Indicative of this individualized approach is a statement by Judge Collins in Wolverhampton v. Emmons."'

I cannot altogether understand the principle upon which Courts of
Equity have acted in sometimes granting orders for specific performance
in these cases, and sometimes not. I think that possibly the explanation is
that the Courts have not uniformly adhered to one principle in such cases.

It looks to me as if the views of the Courts of Equity
7 1 have gone through a
process of development with regard to the subject.
City of London v. Nash"' explicitly depicts this amorphous policy and the volition
of the equity courts to fashion a remedy appropriate to the circumstances.
67 Id.
68 Carpenters Estates, Ltd. v. Davies f19401 I All E.R. 13, 16 (1939).
69 See, e.g., Price v. Corporation of Penzance, 67 Eng. Rep. 748 (1845); South Wales
Ry. Co. v. Wythes, 69 Eng. Rep. 422 (1854); Storer v. Great W. Ry. Co., 63 Eng. Rep. 21
(1842); 4 POMEROY, supra note 51, § 1402.
70 [1901] 1 K.B. 515.
71 Id. at 523-24 (emphasis added).
72 27 Eng. Rep. 859 (1747).
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Although the court was inclined to compel the performance of the defendant's
agreement to replace several old buildings with newly constructed homes, it
refrained from doing so in consideration of the defendant's interests. Since he
had already constructed two homes and repaired the remaining buildings, the
court declared that it was ". . . not obliged to decree a specific performance and
will not, where it would be a hardship; as it would be here upon the defendant
... after having very largely repaired the houses, to pull them down and rebuild
them. . . ."" Although this decision was just and equitable under the circumstances, clearly damages would not have adequately compensated the plaintiff
for his loss.74 The court, however, balanced the interests of each party in securing specific performance and steadfastly refused to adhere to precedent.
Early it had become established that one of the exceptions to the rule which
denies specific performance of a construction contract materialized if three requirements were encountered: the defendant acquired the land in a contract
conditioned by a duty to construct a building as past consideration for the
contract; the details of the construction project were sufficiently certain; and the
plaintiff's interest in securing performance could not be adequately compensated
by damages.75 In Carpenters Estates Ltd. v. Davies,7" the plaintiff fulfilled all
the requirements, except that the contractor's obligation arose out of a contract
which conveyed the land to the plaintiff. Although it is clear that specific performance would have been denied under American decisions,77 the Davies court
adeptly modified the established principle to entitle the plaintiff to specific relief.
The justices ruled that it was not necessary for the defendant to own the land,
but only that he obtain a right of possession to the property where the construction was to occur.7 Essentially, the court evaded the strictures of previous tecisions and fashioned an equitable remedy appropriate to the factual basis which
gave rise to the litigation. It was determined that precedent could not bar
specific relief if the plaintiff was entitled to such a remedy on the merits of the
case:
I am wholly unable to see why the court should be debarred from
granting relief by way of specific performance, and I am not prepared to
accept the statement of ROMER, L.J., [judge who wrote the opinion which
established the rule modified by Davies] as completely exhaustive, so as to
specific performance if I think it right to do so in the
prevent my granting
79
present case.
Not all English courts, however, when confronted with the problems inherent in granting specific performance, follow the approach taken in Davies.
A few courts have preoccupied themselves with precedent to such a degree that
73

Id.

74 Id.
75 Wolverhampton v. Emmons, [1901] 1 K.B. 515, 522.
76 [19401 1 All E.R. 13 (1939).
77 See, e.g., Ayers v. Baker, 216 Ga. 132, 114 S.E.2d 847 (1960); Levene v. Enchanted
Lake Homes, Inc., 115 So. 2d 89 (Fla. App. 1959).
78 Carpenters Estates, Ltd. v. Davies, [1940] 1 All E.R. 13, 17 (1939).
79 Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
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their decisions resemble those of American courts."0 However, the individualized
technique of Davies merits attention from the American judicial system.
IV.Arbitration: A Substitute for Litigation
A. General Principles
The promisee of a construction contract may be forced to utilize machinery
other than the judiciary to secure equitable relief if state and federal courts continue to adhere to precedent and refuse to analyze the circumstances surrounding
a breach. One commentator has strongly suggested that commercial arbitration
may be the solution to an aggrieved party's problems.81 He considers arbitration ".... as one of the most likely methods of doing justice, rather than as a
mere possible secondary alternative. '8 2 Certainly many advantages enure to the
s
parties to the dispute and to society as a whole when arbitration is employed.
It is not only more expeditious than litigation," but also the hearings are conducted under the supervision of experts." Arbitration is also less expensive than
litigation;8 ' a sense of privacy is provided for the parties;" and it serves as a

80 See, e.g., South Wales Ry. Co. v. Wythes, 69 Eng. Rep. 422 (1854). See also text accompanying note 132, infra.
81 Oleck, Specific Performance of Builders Contracts, 21 FORD. L. REV. 156, 171 (1952).
82 Oleck, Specific Performance of Contracts Through Arbitration, 6 ARE. J. (xi.s.) 163,

165 (1951).
83 See generally Address by Arthur J. Goldberg, American Arbitration Association Annual
Meeting, Mar. 17, 1965, in A Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20 ARE. J. (n.s.)

13 (1965).
84 A study conducted by the University of Chicago Law School, with the cooperation of
the American Arbitration Association, revealed that normally commercial arbitration cases are
disposed of between 60 to 90 days. Notwithstanding the fact that the study covered the years
1947 through 1950, the findings are relevant today and worthy of mention. Fifty-seven
percent of the 545 cases studied were disposed of within 90 days. If, however, delays necessitated by the parties' attorneys are considered, 77% were disposed of within a 90 day period.
Also, often the cases were delayed because of the inability to select arbitrators acceptable to
both parties. In cases where there were no delays in selecting arbitrators and the parties did not
cause hearings to be postponed, 83% of the cases were disposed of in less than 90 days.
Smith, Commercial Arbitration at the American Arbitration Association, 11 ARa. J. (n.s.) 3,
17-18 (1956). The judiciary has also acknowledged the expeditious disposition of proceedings.
E.g., Riley v. Pig'n Whistle Candy Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 650, 241 P.2d 294 (1952).
85 M. DOMxE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 20.01 (1968).
The Association's National Panel of Arbitrators comprises approximately 30,000 people. Each
is nominated to the Panel on the basis of their knowledge and expertise in particular fields of
study. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, FACTS ABOUT THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION 1 6 (1971).
86 Savings to the parties may be reflected in two ways. Unnecessary attorney's fees may
be lessened by the quickness.in which the dispute is settled and the party receiving a damages
award may save money in the form of interest which he could have had to pay on any borrowed funds while awaiting the court's disposition of the matter. Also, a saving enures
to the public since arbitration is a private dispute settlement device which costs the taxpayer
nothing; if parties resort to litigation, however, the public must pay for court personnel salaries
and general administration expenses. See Sarpy, Arbitration as a Means of Reducing Court
Congestion, 41 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 182, 189 (1965); S. LAZARUS, J. BRAY, L. CARTER, K.
COLLINS, B. GIBDT, R. HOLTON, P. MATTHEWS, & G. WILLARD, RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES: THE POTENTIAL OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 49-51 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S.
LAzARusI.
87 The publicity attending litigation may scath a business's image'or shatter an individual's reputation; whereas, arbitration is a private proceeding unimpinged by any facets
of publicity. Sarpy, supra note 86, at 189; S. LAZARUS, supra note 86, at 53-54. -
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partial remedy for the overcrowded court dockets.8 One of the major inhibitions of arbitration at the present time, however, is that very few businessmen
are acquainted with its machinery.89
Commercial arbitration has been implemented and promoted largely
through the enactment of statutes. 90 Many states and the federal government 1
have enacted what have been termed modem arbitration laws,9 while other
states' have promulgated limited acts. The modem acts declare arbitration
agreements valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, whether the agreement provides
for the settlement of existing or subsequent disputes. Limited acts, however,
provide that agreements are valid, enforceable, and irrevocable only if they
pertain to the settlement of existing controversies. Agreements to settle disputes
when, and if, a controversy arises are revocable by either party any time prior to
the issuance of an award. Essentially, then, if a state has enacted only a limited
act, the parties are not bound to arbitrate future disputes ;4 but if they voluntarily
proceed to arbitration and an award is issued, the common law will order the
parties to adhere to their original agreement binding themselves to abide by the
award. s If, however, the state has promulgated a modem act, the parties may
be compelled by the courts to arbitrate all disputes and accept the arbitrator's
6
9

ruling.

The most notable principle underlining a commercial arbitration agreement
is the parties' complete discretion and control over the arbitration process.'
Since the arbitrator hears the dispute pursuant to their agreement," he is required
to strictly adhere to procedural or substantive limitations imposed by the parties.
Their agreement may thus effectively limit the scope of the arbitrator's review
and the remedies available at his disposition.99
The American Arbitration Association (A.A.A.), however, has promulgated
the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, effective March 8, 1966, which
88 The case load administered by the American Arbitration Association drastically increased between 1959 and 1970. In 1959 the A.A.A. handled 3,986 cases. In 1970 it administered 21,870. Over 12,000 of those handled in 1970 were uninsured motorists' claims.
The commercial cases totaled 2,658 in 1970 to only 674 in 1959. AMERICAN ARBITRATION AsSOCIATION, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE 70's 4 (1971).
The New York judiciary has also
recognized arbitration as a necessary factor in promoting reduced court dockets. E.g., Grant v.
Koppelman, 59 Misc. 2d 271, 274, 298 N.Y.S.2d 329, 332 (1969).
89 It was determined in one study that 82% of the businessmen contacted had little or
no knowledge of commercial arbitration. Of the 18% indicating knowledge of the subject, a
large percentage were included in the textile and construction industries. S. LAZARUs, supra
note 86, at 42-43.
90 See generally Coulson, Texas Arbitration-Modern Machinery Standing Idle, 25 Sw.
L. J. 290 (1971).
91 E.g., Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1971); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 7501-7514
(McKinney 1963).
92 Asken, Resolving Construction Contract Disputes Through Arbitration, 23 ARB. J. (n.s.)
141, 147 (1968).
93 E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 279-297 (1957).
94 See generally Note, Commercial Arbitration: A Need For Reform, 36 Mo. L. R1v. 343
(1971).
95 Funk v. Funk, 434 P.2d 529, 531 (Ariz. App. 1968).
96 Kustom Kraft Homes v. Leivenstein, 14 Cal. App. 3d 805, 810, 92 Cal. Rptr. 650,
653-54 (1971).
97 E.g., Monte v. Southern Delaware County Authority, 335 F.2d 855 (3rd Cir. 1964);
Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Spain, 36 App. Div. 632, 319 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1971).
98 Bacchus v. Farmers Ins. Group Exch., 467 P.2d 76, 77 (Ariz. App.), vacated on other
grounds, 106 Ariz. 280, 475 P.2d 264 (1970).
99 See, e.g., Freydberg Bros. v. Corey, 177 Misc. 560, 31 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1941).
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have significantly restricted the necessity of the parties to delineate the arbitrator's
power. To secure the advantage of these rules, the A.A.A. has suggested the
incorporation of the following clause into the construction contract:
Any controversey or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the Arbitrator(s) may be
entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof.100
It is not necessary for the arbitration agreement to explicitly confer the
power to decree specific performance upon the arbitrator if this clause is incorporated into the agreement. Section 42 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules states: "The Arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief which he
deems just and equitable..

.""

The arbitrator, then, has the discretion to

grant or refuse specific performance without an express grant of power from
the parties to the agreement.
When disputes are to be settled through arbitration, the participants expressly accept any hazards inherent in the process. The award binds the parties
even though the arbitrator may have made a mistake in fact or law"0 2 or may
have completely disregarded traditional principles of law.'
Arbitrators are
experts in their particular fields, and are not always attorneys:
Arbitrators as a rule are unlearned in law. They are expected to decide
the matters in dispute according to those principles of equity and good
conscience which, in their opinion, will04do justice between the parties, untrammeled by the niceties of the law.1
The judiciary's refusal to subject an arbitrator's award to judicial review is
founded upon its reluctance to frustrate the parties' original agreement to be
bound by the award and to negate a legislature's objectives in promulgating
arbitration statutes.' 5 An award may be vacated only upon explicit statutory or
common law grounds.' 0 Generally, grounds sufficient to vacate an award arise
if fraud or corruption was employed in procuring the award, the arbitrator was
partial, he exceeded his power, or the award was not final and definite.'
Courts may, however, modify an award if there is a mistake upon the face of it
or if the arbitrator included subject matter in the award which was not submitted
to him for determination. 0 8
100

AmERICAN ARBITRATION

AssocuATioN, CONSTRUCTION

INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RuLns

2

(1971).
101 Id. § 42, at 12 (emphasis added).
102 Mars Constructors v. Tropical Enterprises, 51 Hawaii 332, 335-36, 460 P.2d 317, 319
(1969).
103 E.g., Park Construction Co. v. Independent School Dist., 216 Minn. 27, 32, 11 N.W.2d
649, 652 (1943); Goodman v. Lazrus, 15 App. Div. 530, 531, 222 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (1961).
104 Park Construction Co. v. Independent School Dist., 216 Minn. 27, 32, 11 N.W.2d

649, 652 (1943).
105 E.g., Funk v. Funk, 434 P.2d 529, 533 (Ariz. App. 1968); Mars Constructors v.
Tropical Enterprises, 51 Hawaii 332, 335, 460 P.2d 317, 319 (1969).

106 E.g., Kest v. Nathanson, 184 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1966); Park Construction Co. v. Inde-

pendent School Dist., 216 Minn. 27, 33, 11 N.W.2d 649, 653 (1943).
107 E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 7511 (b) (McKinney 1963).
108 Id. § 7511(c).
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B. Grayson-Robinson: An Obscure Steppingstone
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Iris Const. Corp. 9 established the principle that a state court was compelled to confirm an arbitration award which
decreed specific performance of a five million dollar construction contract, notwithstanding the fact that the substance of the decree was contrary to law. The
factual situation which gave rise to the litigation " forced the Court of Appeals
of New York into an atypical position between two strongly competing forces. It
was compelled to either invalidate the parties' original agreement to submit their
disputes to arbitration or confirm an award repugnant to the established law.
Either mode selected would have been inconsistent with a tribunal's role of dispensing justice. If the former had been selected, the court would have expressed
its reluctance to sanction a valid contract, while selection of the latter would
have indicated its displeasure over the general principles which deny specific
performance of construction contracts. The majority of the court, however,
effectively avoided the need to select either foundation for its decision by resorting
to other consequences which would have ensued from a ruling contrary to that
espoused. Although the majority recognized the need to uphold the parties'
intent of settling their disputes through arbitration,"' they determined that a
contrary decision would have clearly forestalled the development of arbitration
as a private dispute settlement device. Since the state legislature had expressed
its desire to foster the arbitration process via legislation,"' 2 the court was not in
a position to frustrate that desire. The statutory grounds upon which the award
could have been effectively vacated were minimal.
The majority thus effectively manipulated the underlying basis of GraysonRobinson to avoid answering the obvious question of the continued efficacy of
that principle which denies specific performance of construction contracts. They
rationalized their holding upon the similarity which existed between the contract
in question and other contracts which the court had specifically enforced, instead
of advocating the modernization of equity principles. Writing for the majority,
Mr. Chief Justice Desmond stated that ".

.

. there is nothing extraordinary

about this ordinary building contract. Appellant is simply being required to fulfill its promises.""' 3 However, the construction cost of five million dollars is
sufficient to indicate that it was not simply an "ordinary building contract." If
the court would have taken a more detailed and individualized approach to the
109 8 N.Y.2d 133, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303, 168 N.E.2d 377 (1960). This decision has been
heavily criticized in student law journals. See, e.g., 3 WM. & MARY L. REv. 203 (1961); 61
COLUM. L. REv. 296 (1961); 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 363 (1961); 6 VILL. L. Rxv. 255
(1960); 10 BUFF. L. REV. 67 (1960); contra, 25 ALBANY L. REV. 140 (1961).
110 Iris Construction Corp. agreed to build and lease a five million dollar structure to
Grayson-Robinson for twenty-five years. Subsequent to the commencement of construction,
Iris was unable to secure a mortgage to finance the construction and Grayson-Robinson refused to heed Iris' request for increased rental payments. Since Iris was forced to abandon
the construction project, they submitted their dispute to arbitration in conformity with their
agreement.
111 Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Iris Const. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 138, 202 N.Y.S.2d
303, 307, 168 N.E.2d 377, 378-79 (1960).
112 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1963).
113 Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Iris Const. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 138, 202 N.Y.S.2d
303, 307, 168 N.E.2d 377, 379 (1960).
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problems inherent in Grayson-Robinson, it could have provided courts with a
foundation for granting such decrees without the arbitrator's preliminary assent.
New York decisions rendered both before and subsequent to GraysonRobinson also occasioned the opportunity for the courts to question the antiquated theories which permeate specific performance. In each decision, however, this central question was intentionally avoided. Staklinski v. Pyramid
Electric Co." 4 established the court's consent to bind an employer to a contract
to employ an individual for eleven years, notwithstanding the fact that the
employer had become dissatisfied with his performance. The court reasoned that
the arbitration agreement was valid and the power to render it meaningless
after the parties had bargained for such a clause was beyond the court's discretion." 5 Also, the fact that a court sitting in equity would not have ordered the
employer to retain the employee in fulfillment of his contract was immaterial
to the court." 6 Similarly evasive reasoning provided a basis for the court's refusal to stay arbitration proceedings in Exercycle Corp. V. Maratta:"7
[A] court is not justified in staying the arbitration even if the claim would not
be enforceable at law. In point of fact, we have declined to enjoin an
arbitration even where an arbitrator has been asked to do what a court of
law would clearly not do." s
Although Maratta and Staklinski are significant contributions to the realization of a modem approach to specific performance, they have failed, just as
Grayson-Robinson has, to provide a foundation for courts sitting in equity to
assume the direct responsibility of modifying the present approach."'
Grayson-Robinson, however, was not totally devoid of any value to the
promisee of a construction contract. He may now avoid litigation and be confident that his contract will be specifically enforced, provided that the construction contractor expressly agrees to grant the arbitrator such power or assents to
arbitration conducted in conformity with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules."" If businessmen resort to arbitration and provide the arbitrator with the
requisite power, the ultimate determination of the efficacy of equitable awards
lies within the discretion of the arbitrator.'' If specific performance is awarded,
courts would be compelled to confirm the award, provided, of course, that they
are willing to follow New York's lead on this point. Apparently, most states
22
would be obliged to do so.'

114 6 N.Y.2d 159, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541, 160 N.E.2d 78 (1959).
115 Id. at 163, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 542, 160 N.E.2d at 79.
116 Id. at 163-64, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 543, 160 N.E.2d at 80.
117 9 N.Y.2d 329, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 174 N.E.2d 463 (1961).
118 Id. at 337, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 358, 174 N.E.2d at 466.
119 City Stores Co. v. Ammerman, alluded to Grayson-Robinson, but it did not provide the
impetus for Ammerman.
120 The parties could also secure specific performance if they elect to have the arbitration
conducted in conformity with the American Arbitration Association Rules. Section 42 of
those Rules is identical with § 42 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules.
121 Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 336, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 357-58, 174 N.E.2d
463, 466 (1961).
122 See, e.g., Morris v. Zuckerman, 69 Cal. 2d 686, 72 Cal. Rptr. 880, 446 P.2d 1000
(1968); Sydnor Pump & Well Co. v. County School Bd., 182 Va. 156, 28 S.E.2d 33 (1943).
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C. The Parallels of Arbitration
When a business entity adheres to outmoded business practices, it may be
able to survive for decades, but it can never attain a viable state without remaining adept at business administration. If the adoption of new administrative
techniques is frustrated, history indicates that a new entity will develop at the
expense of the former. Although this situation is particularly characteristic of
the business world, which thrives on competition, it is not inapplicable to governmental institutions.
Although equity administration was nurtured by innovation during its formative years, it has become stagnant since the turn of the twentieth century and
is no longer a viable institution. Roscoe Pound's recognition of this defect nearly
fifty-five years ago prompted him to remark that "... the exigencies of judicial
administration of justice will sooner or later require resort to modern machinery
despite all technical and historical objections." 12 He implicitly assumed, however, that the requisite machinery would develop from within the judicial
system to replace the antiquated theories permeating the administration of
equity. Instead, the inability of the system to cope with a changing society has
forced the emergence of arbitration.
The increased use of the arbitration process by business 24 is not only

evidence of the public's recognition of its many advantages vis-h-vis litigation, but
also indicative of its ability to meet societal demands. It is not, however, without
limitations. Some commentators have suggested that arbitrators are permitted
too much discretion in formulating new "rules" without an effective check upon
them by the courts.' 25 It is claimed that arbitration is a device to exert control
over society.26 and prompt unpredictability in the business world. 2 7 The argument has also been formulated that occasionally an arbitrator may be unable to
remain impartial throughout the hearings.' 28 The efficacy of these contentions,
however, must be determined in consideration of the distrust associated with any
new institution which is developed to remedy the defects of another. The
colonists, too, were very distrustful of the development of equity courts in
America. 2 ' Their distrust, however, did not prevent development, but only
delayed it.
V. Conclusion
Notwithstanding the fact that arbitration may be employed as an effective
device to secure specific performance of construction contracts, it is imperative
that the judicial system eventually adopt an individualized approach to the ad123 Pound, supra note 24, at 436.
124 See note 88, supra.
125 Kronstein, Arbitration Is Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 661, 667 (1963); The Court of
Appeals, 1959 Term, 10 BUFF. L. REv. 48, 69 (1960).
126 Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government, 54 YALE L.J. 36,
39 (1944).
127 Note, Commercial Arbitration: Expanding the Judicial Role, 52 MrzqN. L. REv. 1218,
1230-31 (1968).
128 Editorial, 17 Aim J. (n.s.)
65 (1962).
129 Oleck, supra note 2, at 40-41.
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ministration of equity. The issues permeating enforcement of a decree and
supervision of the construction project remain the same whether an arbitrator's
specific performance award is confirmed by the court or a court takes the initiative and issues the decree without the arbitrator's preliminary inducement."'
In either case, the court must bear the burden of supervision and enforcement.1 '
Thus, if both the judiciary and arbitration continue to adhere to their present
approaches, an injured party's available remedies will be entirely dependent
upon whether the dispute was settled by arbitration or litigation. Such a repugnant situation should not be permitted to exist.
One commentator has remarked that the administration of equity in
England also suffers from the application of precedent. He has suggested,
however, that the judiciary is incapable of solving its problems without legislative
assistance:
ITihe application of the doctrine of precedent to the Court of Chancery
within the last 150 years has done much to ... abrogate the fluid nature
of the rules themselves. Equity has become as stereotyped as the common
law and is no longer capable of re-adapting
1 82 itself to the changing conditions
without the assistance of the legislature.
The inequitable administration of equity in America may also be forced to await
legislative correction. Grayson-Robinson provided the impetus for courts to
act, but they failed to do so.' 33

Gary L. Lennard

130 See Note, Specific Performance: A Liberalization of Equity Standards,49 IowA L. Rzv.
1290, 1300 (1964).
131 See generally Busch, Does the Arbitrator's Function Survive His Award? 16 ARB. J.
(n.s.) 31 (1961).
132 Delany, Equity and the Law Reform Committee, 24 MODERN L. Rv. 116, 118 (1961).
133 See Oleck, Specific Performance of Contracts Through Arbitration, 6 ARB. J. (n.s.)
163, 165-66 (1951).

